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The security of device-independent (DI) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols relies on
the violation of Bell inequalities. As such, their security can be established based on minimal
assumptions about the devices, but their implementation necessarily requires the distribution of
entangled states. In a setting with fully trusted devices, any entanglement-based protocol is essen-
tially equivalent to a corresponding prepare-and-measure protocol. This correspondence, however,
is not generally valid in the DI setting unless one makes extra assumptions about the devices. Here
we prove that a known tight lower bound on the min entropy in terms of the CHSH Bell correl-
ator, which has featured in a number of entanglement-based DI QKD security proofs, also holds
in a prepare-and-measure setting, subject only to the assumption that the source is limited to a
two-dimensional Hilbert space.
The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) rests
on tradeoffs inherent to quantum physics, such as the im-
possibility of state cloning, the measurement-disturbance
tradeoff, or the monogamy of entanglement. Simil-
arly, the security of device-independent (DI) QKD [1–
3], which can be established with minimal assumptions
about the internal functioning of the devices, is based on
a fundamental tradeoff between the violation of Bell in-
equalities and the unpredictability of quantum measure-
ments. The simplest setting in which this tradeoff can
be stated involves two separate parties, Alice and Bob,
sharing two subsystems in an entangled state on which
they perform, respectively, one of two measurements
x, y ∈ {0, 1} yielding one of two outcomes a, b ∈ {0, 1}.
In this setting, the expectation value
S =
∑
abxy
(−1)a+b+xyP (ab | xy) (1)
of the CHSH Bell correlator [4], where P (ab | xy) denotes
the joint probabilities for outcomes a, b given measure-
ments x, y, implies the fundamental lower bound
Hmin(A | E) ≥ 1− log2
(
1 +
√
2− S2/4) (2)
on the min entropy Hmin(A | E) of Alice’s outcome con-
ditioned on one of Alice’s inputs (say, x = 0) and the
quantum side information E of any potential adversary.
This relation is tight and is attained with equality with
the optimal attack described in [3].
Contrarily to other tradeoffs used in standard QKD,
which assume some level of trust and characterisation of
the quantum systems, the bound (2) is device independ-
ent in the sense that it holds for any quantum state ρABE
and measurement operators {Ma|x} and {Mb|y} charac-
terising Alice’s and Bob’s devices. The relation (2) was
first derived in the context of DI-randomness certification
∗ Erik.Woodhead@icfo.es
[5] and has since featured as an ingredient in a number
of DI QKD security proofs [6–8].
Since they are based on the violation of Bell inequal-
ities, DI QKD protocols are entanglement-based (EB)
protocols. Indeed, in the DI setting, entanglement is
necessary to guarantee security with a minimal set of
assumptions on the devices [9]. Implementations of tra-
ditional (non-DI) QKD protocols, such as BB84 [10], are,
however, usually of the prepare-and-measure (PM) type.
In a PM protocol, Alice uses a source to prepare certain
states which are then transmitted through a quantum
channel to Bob who performs measurements on them.
PM schemes have the practical advantage that they do
not require the manipulation of entanglement. For this
same reason, however, they cannot be fully DI. Recent
works have nevertheless considered the possibility of PM
QKD schemes that are at least partially DI [11, 12].
In traditional QKD, a famous argument establishes an
equivalence between the security of PM and EB pro-
tocols [13]. In the BB84 protocol, for instance, Alice
could prepare the four BB84 states by preparing a Φ+
Bell state (|0〉A|0〉A′ + |1〉A|1〉A′)/
√
2 (in some Hilbert
space HA ⊗HA′) in her lab and measuring either in the
computational ({|0〉A, |1〉A}) basis or in the Hadamard
({|+〉A, |−〉A}) basis in HA and transmitting the projec-
ted state in HA′ to Bob. Since the security can only be
reduced if the Φ+ state is replaced by a state |ψ〉ABE
chosen by an adversary (Eve) and shared between Alice,
Bob, and Eve (the situation considered in EB security
proofs), a security proof of the EB version of the BB84
protocol automatically implies the security of the PM
version.
In the DI setting one can similarly associate a corres-
ponding PM scheme to any EB scheme. In particular,
one can consider a PM version of the above CHSH scen-
ario, as illustrated in Fig. 1. In this PM version, Alice
possesses a source which can emit one of four different
quantum states, noted ρ, ρ′, σ, and σ′, depending on a
respective choice of input (x, a) = (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), and
(1, 1). Alice randomly chooses x ∈ {0, 1} (not necessar-
ily equiprobably) and chooses a ∈ {0, 1} randomly and
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Figure 1. Semi-device-independent scenario with the prepare-
and-measure CHSH estimation. Alice’s source (SA) can emit
one of four different qubit states ρx,a ∈ {ρ, ρ′, σ, σ′} depending
on a choice of input (x, a) ∈ {0, 1}2. Bob’s measurement
device (MB) performs one of two measurements depending on
a choice of input y ∈ {0, 1}, yielding an outcome b ∈ {0, 1}.
equiprobably and attempts to transmit the correspond-
ing state to Bob, who may perform one of two binary-
outcome measurements on them (indexed by the input
y ∈ {0, 1} and output b ∈ {0, 1}). We can then define
S =
1
2
∑
abxy
(−1)a+b+xyP (b | axy) . (3)
as the PM analogue of the CHSH correlator (1).
In a traditional (non-DI) setting, the equivalence
between the EB and PM scenarios would imply that the
bound (2) on Alice’s randomness as a function of the
CHSH correlator also holds in the PM version. In a DI
setting, however, this equivalence is not immediate at all.
First, the PM version cannot be fully DI (because the
source could simply transmit Alice’s choice of input clas-
sically). The security of a PM version will thus depend
on some minimal assumption about the source. One pos-
sibility is to assume a dimension bound on one or more
of the devices; such semi -DI PM schemes were proposed
in [11]. Second, states prepared by measurements on half
of an entangled pair satisfy a constraint called basis inde-
pendence: if a set {ρx} of states is prepared with associ-
ated probabilities {px} by performing a measurement on
half an entangled pair, the average state
∑
x pxρx is inde-
pendent of the measurement used to prepare it (a version
of the no-signalling principle). The basis-independence
constraint, however, need not be satisfied, and is actu-
ally explicitly relaxed, in the PM setting.
We show here that the fundamental bound on Alice’s
min entropy (2) nevertheless still holds in a semi-DI set-
ting, with the PM version of the CHSH correlator (3)
used in place of (1). Such a result can then be used
to bring the semi-DI setting (for which security proofs
are lacking) closer in line to known security results for
DI QKD. In particular, the conditional min entropy can,
for instance, be used to lower bound the Devetak-Winter
key rate [14] in order to establish the security against
collective attacks of a semi-DI QKD protocol based on
the estimation of the CHSH correlator (3).
Dimension assumption.— Let us start by making
precise the assumption that we need to derive (2) in the
PM setting. During the transmission from Alice to Bob,
an adversary may perform an arbitrary unitary operation
on the states sent by Alice, with the intent of gaining
some information about them. (More general quantum
operations can be made unitary by enlarging the ad-
versary’s Hilbert space, according to Stinespring’s dila-
tion theorem.) Following this unitary attack, the emitted
state ρx,a is now shared between Bob and Eve [15], i.e.,
acts on a Hilbert space HB⊗HE. We make the assump-
tion that the two differences ρ − ρ′ and σ − σ′ between
the source states (after the unitary attack) share their
support on a common two-dimensional subspace HA of
HB ⊗HE. We refer to this condition as the qubit source
assumption. We will later discuss the physical implica-
tions of this assumption; for now we simply take it as a
mathematical condition satisfied by the states prepared
by Alice’s box.
A simple example illustrates the necessity of the qubit
source assumption. Specifically, if Alice’s source prepares
pure states ρx,a = |ψx,a〉〈ψx,a| which are duplicate copies
of the BB84 states,
|ψ00〉 = |0〉B|0〉E , |ψ01〉 = |1〉B|1〉E , (4)
|ψ10〉 = |+〉B|+〉E , |ψ11〉 = |−〉B|−〉E , (5)
in which |0〉 and |1〉 are orthonormal and |±〉 = 1√
2
[|0〉 ±
|1〉], the maximal value S = 2√2 can be attained while
Eve always acquires exactly the same state as Bob. These
states are not linearly independent (one can readily verify
that |0〉|0〉+ |1〉|1〉 = |+〉|+〉+ |−〉|−〉) and span a three-
dimensional Hilbert space, from which we see that the
security of the semi-DI scenario is fully compromised if
the qubit source assumption is not satisfied.
Min entropy and Eve’s distinguishability.— To prove
the bound (2), let us first note that if the input a is
chosen equiprobably, its min entropy, conditioned on the
case x = 0 and on Eve’s quantum side information, is a
function of the classical-quantum state
τAE =
1
2 |0〉〈0| ⊗ ρE + 12 |1〉〈1| ⊗ ρ′E , (6)
in which ρE and ρ
′
E are Eve’s marginals of the states ρ
and ρ′ after some given unitary attack (in the rest of
this article, subscripts indicate partial tracing in the ob-
vious way, e.g., ρB = TrE[ρ]). Evaluated on (6), the min
entropy can be expressed [16, 17] as
Hmin(A | E) = 1− log2
(
1 +D(ρE, ρ
′
E)
)
, (7)
with the trace distance between ρE and ρ
′
E defined by
D(ρE, ρ
′
E) =
1
2‖ρE − ρ′E‖1 where ‖A‖1 = Tr[
√
A†A] de-
notes the trace norm of an operator A. We will obtain
the main result (2) by showing that the trace distance
appearing in (7) is upper bounded by
D(ρE, ρ
′
E) ≤
√
2− S2/4 (8)
in terms of S.
Outline of proof.— We now outline the derivation of
(8). The lengthier and more pedestrian parts of the proof
are given in the appendix.
3Let us first introduce operators Z and X defined such
that
ρ− ρ′ = αZ , (9)
σ − σ′ = βX , (10)
with α = 12‖ρ − ρ′‖1 and β = 12‖σ − σ′‖1 such that
the (traceless qubit) operators Z and X satisfy 12‖Z‖1 =
1
2‖X‖1 = 1. Then, in terms of these operators, the CHSH
expectation value (3) can be expressed as
S = 12 Tr
[
UB
(
αZB + βXB
)
+ VB
(
αZB − βXB
)]
, (11)
where UB =
∑
b(−1)bMb|y=0 and VB =
∑
b(−1)bMb|y=1
are Hermitian unitary operators acting on HB describ-
ing the observables corresponding to the (without loss of
generality, projective) measurements y = 0 and y = 1.
A general result for any pair of Hermitian unitaries
is that they admit a common block diagonalisation in
blocks of dimension no more than 2. We can thus set
UB =
⊕
k
UkB , VB =
⊕
k
V kB , (12)
in which UkB and V
k
B are still Hermitian and unitary and
of dimension at most 2, ∀k (the Jordan lemma [18], see
Lemma 2 of [9] for a short proof). This reduces the prob-
lem to considering qubit subspaces on Bob’s side. For
each subspace k, we can define the corresponding contri-
bution to S by
Sk =
1
2αTr[(U
k
B + V
k
B )ZB] +
1
2β Tr[(U
k
B− V kB )XB] , (13)
with
∑
k Sk = S. Similarly, we define a probabilistic
weight for each subspace k by
pk =
1
2 Tr[1
k
BIB] , (14)
with
∑
k pk = 1, defined in terms of the projection op-
erator 1kB on the kth subspace (satisfying 1
k
B = (U
k
B)
2 =
(V kB )
2) and the partial trace IB = TrE[I] of the identity
on the space of source states (satisfying I = Z2 = X2).
We now introduce an orthonormal basis {|y〉, |y′〉} of
the space of source states chosen such that Y = |y〉〈y| −
|y′〉〈y′| is orthogonal to the operators Z and X, defined
by Eqs. (9) and (10), on the Bloch sphere. In this basis,
in an appropriate phase convention, Z and X can be
expressed as
Z = ei
ϕ
2 |y〉〈y′|+ e−i
ϕ
2 |y′〉〈y| , (15)
X = e−i
ϕ
2 |y〉〈y′|+ ei
ϕ
2 |y′〉〈y| (16)
for some (a priori unknown) angle ϕ, while the source
space identity operator I takes the expression
I = |y〉〈y|+ |y′〉〈y′| . (17)
One can readily verify that {Z, Y } = {X, Y } = 0, that
[Z, X] = 2i sin(ϕ)Y , and that {Z, X} = cos(ϕ)I. An
important step in the derivation of the trace-distance
bound (8) consists in turning the value of S into a con-
straint on the part YB of the operator Y accessible to
Bob [19]. Specifically, in each subspace k defined by the
block diagonalisation (12), we prove in Appendix A that
there exists a Hermitian unitary operator W kB with the
property that
α 12 Tr[W
k
BYB] ≥
√
S 2k /4− p 2k , (18)
where Sk and pk are as defined in (13) and (14). Eq. (18)
holds regardless of the value of β appearing in (13) and
of ϕ in (15) and (16). Note that α can also be eliminated
using that 12 Tr[W
k
BYB] ≥ α 12 Tr[W kBYB].
In order to obtain the upper bound (8) on D(ρE, ρ
′
E),
we also derive a tradeoff between the quantity
1
2 Tr[W
k
BYB], appearing in (18), and the distinguishabil-
ity of Eve’s states. Specifically, we prove in Appendix B
that, for any Hermitian unitary UE acting on HE, the
inequality
1
4 Tr[W
k
BYB]
2 + 14 Tr
[
(1kB ⊗ UE)Z
]2 ≤ p 2k (19)
holds in each subspace k.
We obtain (8) by taking for UE in (19) a Hermitian
unitary such that 12 Tr[UEZE] =
1
2‖ZE‖1 [20]. Because
D(ρE, ρ
′
E) = α
1
2‖ZE‖1 ≤ 12‖ZE‖1, the trace distance is
upper bounded by
D(ρE, ρ
′
E) ≤
∑
k
1
2 Tr
[
(1kB ⊗ UE)Z
]
. (20)
Using (18) and (19) and omitting α, we have
1
2 Tr
[
(1kB ⊗ UE)Z
] ≤ pk√2− (Sk/pk)2/4 , (21)
and substituting (21) into (20) and using that the func-
tion S 7→√2− S2/4 is concave, we finally obtain
D(ρE, ρ
′
E) ≤
∑
k
1
2 Tr
[
(1kB ⊗ UE)Z
]
≤
∑
k
pk
√
2− (Sk/pk)2/4
≤
√
2− (∑k Sk)2/4
=
√
2− S2/4 . (22)
Combining with the expression (7) for the min entropy,
we obtain (2).
As with its EB counterpart, (8) and the resulting min-
entropy bound are tight and are attained with a PM ver-
sion of the optimal attack originally given in [3]; for com-
pleteness we have included a description of this attack in
Appendix C.
Discussion of the qubit assumption.— Having proven
our main result, let us now discuss the qubit source as-
sumption in more detail. Note first that Alice’s “pre-
paration” device may not in general actually prepare a
new state from scratch, but instead implement a trans-
formation on a preexisting qubit stored in her box, which
4could be entangled with Eve’s system prior to the pro-
tocol. The presence of such prior entanglement between
Alice’s device and Eve may completely break the secur-
ity of a PM scheme, as noted in [11]. However, since
our qubit assumption is formulated in the total space
HB⊗HE including Eve’s Hilbert space, it naturally lim-
its the amount of potential prior entanglement between
Alice and Eve (or Alice and Bob) and thus a nice math-
ematical feature of our formulation is that we do not
need to state this limitation on prior entanglement as a
separate, additional assumption.
On the other hand, since our qubit assumption is for-
mulated in the space HB⊗HE after Eve’s attack, it may
not be possible to practically verify this assumption in a
cryptographic setting (since Alice and Bob do not have
access to Eve’s system). Note, however, that a suffi-
cient condition for our assumption to be satisfied is that
(i) there exists no prior entanglement between Alice and
Eve or Bob (e.g., Alice’s preparation box has no quantum
memory), and (ii) the states sent by Alice’s box, before
going through the channel and suffering Eve’s (without
loss of generality, unitary) attack, are such that ρ − ρ′
and σ − σ′ have support in the same two-dimensional
subspace. Under these conditions, the states ρ − ρ′ and
σ−σ′ after Eve’s unitary attack will still share the same
two-dimensional support and thus our qubit source as-
sumption will be satisfied. However, the condition that
we use to derive the min-entropy bound (2) is formally
weaker than the combination of i) and ii) as these only
represent sufficient conditions for our assumption to be
satisfied.
Another nice feature of our formulation is that the
qubit assumption refers only to the differences ρ−ρ′ and
σ − σ′ and not directly to the states ρx,a themselves,
which may live in a higher dimensional Hilbert space.
For instance, in an optical implementation, each “qubit”
may be a qubit encoded in the polarisation degree of free-
dom of a single photon, but may also possess a vacuum
component and thus formally be a three-level system of
the form ρx,a = p|0〉〈0|+(1−p)ρ˜a,x, where ρ˜a,x is the one-
photon polarised qubit part. Still, the differences ρ − ρ′
and σ− σ′ only involve the genuine qubit parts and thus
satisfy our qubit source assumption.
Finally, let us remark that our assumption can imme-
diately be weakened in two ways. First, using convexity
arguments, it is easy to see that the min-entropy bound
(2) still holds if Alice’s, Bob’s, and Eve’s systems share
prior classical randomness, provided that for any value
λ of the shared randomness, the differences ρλ − ρ′λ and
σλ − σ′λ satisfy the qubit assumption. Again, it may not
be possible to practically verify this assumption in the
most general DI setting (as Alice and Bob will not have
access to the individual values of the shared randomness
if their devices are uncharacterised). However, a suffi-
cient condition for this assumption to be satisfied is if
each of the averaged states ρx,a =
∑
λ qλρx,a;λ are con-
tained in the same qubit space, a condition which does
not require any knowledge of the shared randomness.
Second, we point out that the bound on the min en-
tropy is also robust with respect to the qubit assump-
tion; i.e., this assumption need only be approximately
verified. Specifically, suppose that, instead of assum-
ing (9) and (10), we assume that there exist traceless
two-dimensional unit operators αZ˜ and βX˜ such that
1
2‖(ρ−ρ′)−αZ˜‖1 ≤ ε and 12‖(σ−σ′)−βX˜‖1 ≤ ε. Then
it is easy to see that D(ρE, ρ
′
E) ≤ 12‖αZ˜E‖1 + ε and that
the CHSH expectation value computed with αZ˜ and βX˜
cannot differ from S by more than 4ε. Small deviations
from the qubit source assumption can thus be tolerated,
with a bound on the min entropy no worse than
Hmin(A | E) ≥ 1− log2
(
1+
√
2− (S − 4ε)2/4+ε) . (23)
Conclusion.— We gave a proof that the fundamental
lower bound (2) on the randomness of Alice’s outcomes as
a function of the CHSH expression, originally derived in
the context of device-independent QKD and randomness
certification, still holds in a PM setting with a qubit as-
sumption. Though the equivalence between EB and PM
schemes in standard QKD may a priori suggest that this
should naturally be the case, this is not at all immediate
as this equivalence breaks in a DI setting. Indeed, the
techniques that we have used here to establish the lower
bound (2) in the PM setting are quite different from the
ones used to establish the EB version of this bound.
This fundamental lower bound (2) can now, in prin-
ciple, be used as a building block to prove the security
of semi-DI QKD protocols, in the same way that it was
used in the fully DI setting in Refs. [6–8].
We remark that in the EB scenario, an analogous tight
bound for the Holevo quantity (or, equivalently, the con-
ditional von Neumann entropy) instead of the min en-
tropy had earlier been presented in [3] as part of a secur-
ity proof against collective attacks. The conditional von
Neumann entropy can likewise, in principle, be bounded
in the PM scenario. A partial result for the von Neumann
entropy, restricted to the case where Bob’s measurements
are additionally assumed to be two-dimensional, is given
in Ref. [21].
Finally, having shown that our min-entropy bound
holds for Alice’s system conditioned on Eve, it would be
interesting to investigate whether a similar result holds
for the min entropy Hmin(B | E) associated with Bob’s
measurement outcome. In particular, a version of this
result conditioned on just one of Alice’s state prepar-
ations would apply immediately to the problem of ran-
domness certification [5, 22–24], which has similarly been
investigated in PM scenarios [25, 26].
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Appendix A: Proof of (18)
As explained in the main text, after applying the
Jordan lemma the optimal expectation value (11) of S
can be expressed as S =
∑
k Sk, with
Sk =
1
2αTr[(Uk + Vk)Z] +
1
2β Tr[(Uk − Vk)X] , (A1)
where we have set Uk = U
k
B ⊗ 1E and Vk = V kB ⊗ 1E,
and UkB and V
k
B are the Hermitian unitary operators of
dimension at most 2 appearing in (12) and (13).
Inserting the expressions (15) and (16) for the operat-
ors Z and X, Sk can be expressed as
Sk = αRe
[〈y|e−iϕ2 (Uk + Vk)|y′〉]
+ βRe
[〈y|eiϕ2 (Uk − Vk)|y′〉] (A2)
in terms of the y states. The only interesting case is
where both UkB and V
k
B are two-dimensional and of ei-
genvalues +1 and −1. In this case, if UkB and V kB are
separated by an angle γk on the Bloch sphere, one can
choose an orthonormal basis {|wk〉B, |w′k〉B} in which
UkB + V
k
B = 2 cos
(
γk
2
)(|wk〉〈w′k|B + |w′k〉〈wk|B) , (A3)
UkB − V kB = 2 sin
(
γk
2
)(
i|wk〉〈w′k|B − i|w′k〉〈wk|B
)
. (A4)
Inserting this into (A2), the expression for Sk can be
simplified to
Sk/2 = Re
[〈y|(λk|wk〉〈w′k|B + µk|w′k〉〈wk|B)⊗ 1E|y′〉] ,
(A5)
where we have collected the various angles into
λk = α cos
(
γk
2
)
e−i
ϕ
2 + iβ sin
(
γk
2
)
ei
ϕ
2 ,
µk = α cos
(
γk
2
)
e−i
ϕ
2 − iβ sin(γk2 )eiϕ2 (A6)
for convenience. Introducing now vectors
|Ak〉 = (〈wk|B ⊗ 1E)|y〉 , (A7)
|A′k〉 = (〈w′k|B ⊗ 1E)|y′〉 , (A8)
|Bk〉 = (〈w′k|B ⊗ 1E)|y〉 , (A9)
|B′k〉 = (〈wk|B ⊗ 1E)|y′〉 (A10)
(in HE) in order to further simplify the notation, we ob-
tain
Sk/2 = Re
[
λk〈Ak|A′k〉+ µk〈Bk|B′k〉
]
. (A11)
Finally, in order to reexpress Sk in a form better suited
for determining an upper bound, we introduce new coef-
ficients
ξk = cos
(
γk+ϕ
2
)
+ i sin
(
γk−ϕ
2
)
, (A12)
νk = cos
(
γk−ϕ
2
)− i sin(γk+ϕ2 ) , (A13)
and
γ± = 12 (α± β) , (A14)
such that
λk = γ+ξk + γ−νk , (A15)
µk = γ+νk + γ−ξk . (A16)
Inserting these into the expression for Sk, we arrive at
Sk/2 = Re
[
ξk
(
γ+〈Ak|A′k〉+ γ−〈Bk|B′k〉
)
+ νk
(
γ−〈Ak|A′k〉+ γ+〈Bk|B′k〉
)]
. (A17)
In order to obtain a useful upper bound on Sk, we
begin by taking the absolute value of the various terms
in (A17), obtaining
Sk/2 ≤ |ξk|
(|γ+||〈Ak|A′k〉|+ |γ−||〈Bk|B′k〉|)
+ |νk|
(|γ−|∣∣〈Ak|A′k〉∣∣+ |γ+|∣∣〈Bk|B′k〉∣∣) . (A18)
Applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, using that
|ξk|2 + |νk|2 = 2, and developing,
S 2k /4 ≤ 2
(
|γ+|
∣∣〈Ak|A′k〉∣∣+ |γ−|∣∣〈Bk|B′k〉∣∣)2
+ 2
(
|γ−|
∣∣〈Ak|A′k〉∣∣+ |γ+|∣∣〈Bk|B′k〉∣∣)2
= 2(γ 2+ + γ
2
− )
(∣∣〈Ak|A′k〉∣∣2 + ∣∣〈Bk|B′k〉∣∣2)
+ 8|γ+γ−|
∣∣〈Ak|A′k〉∣∣∣∣〈Bk|B′k〉∣∣
≤ 2(γ 2+ + γ 2− )
(
‖Ak‖2‖A′k‖2 + ‖Bk‖2‖B′k‖2
)
+ 8|γ+γ−|‖Ak‖‖A′k‖‖Bk‖‖B′k‖ , (A19)
where we used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality again
to substitute |〈Ak|A′k〉| ≤ ‖Ak‖‖A′k‖ and |〈Bk|B′k〉| ≤‖Bk‖‖B′k‖. Applying now that
2‖Ak‖‖A′k‖ ≤ ΣA = ‖Ak‖2 + ‖A′k‖2 , (A20)
2‖Bk‖‖B′k‖ ≤ ΣB = ‖Bk‖2 + ‖B′k‖2 , (A21)
we find that
S 2k /4 ≤ 12 (γ 2+ + γ 2− )
[
Σ 2A + Σ
2
B
]
+ 2|γ+γ−|ΣAΣB
= min
(
α2, β2
)
1
4
(
ΣA − ΣB
)2
+ max
(
α2, β2
)
1
4
(
ΣA + ΣB
)2
. (A22)
Reinserting the definitions of the vectors |Ak〉, |A′k〉, |Bk〉,
and |B′k〉, note that
ΣA − ΣB = Tr[W kBYB] , (A23)
ΣA + ΣB = Tr[1
k
BIB] , (A24)
6where we recall that we defined
I = |y〉〈y|+ |y′〉〈y′| , (A25)
Y = |y〉〈y| − |y′〉〈y′| , (A26)
IB = TrE[I], YB = TrE[Y ], and we have introduced
1kB = |wk〉〈wk|B + |w′k〉〈w′k|B , (A27)
W kB = |wk〉〈wk|B − |w′k〉〈w′k|B . (A28)
In this way, we find that Sk is upper bounded by
S 2k /4 ≤ min
(
α2, β2
)
1
4 Tr[W
k
BYB]
2
+ max
(
α2, β2
)
1
4 Tr[1
k
BIB]2 . (A29)
Finally, we substitute min(α2, β2) ≤ α2, max(α2, β2) ≤
1, and pk =
1
2 Tr[1
k
BIB] in order to obtain
S 2k /4 ≤ α2 14 Tr[W kBYB]2 + p 2k , (A30)
which rearranges to (18) in the main text. (If 12 Tr[W
k
BYB]
is negative, we simply replace W kB 7→ −W kB.)
Appendix B: Proof of (19)
We start with the term 12 Tr[W
k
BYB]. In an appropriate
phase convention, the operator Y can be expressed as
Y = ei
ϕ
2 |z〉〈z′|+ e−i
ϕ
2 |z′〉〈z| , (B1)
where |z〉 and |z′〉 are the eigenstates of Z such that Z =
|z〉〈z| − |z′〉〈z′|. In terms of these z states,
1
2 Tr[W
k
BYB] =
1
2 Tr
[
(W kB ⊗ 1E)Y
]
= Re
[
e−i
ϕ
2 〈z|W kB ⊗ 1E|z′〉
]
≤ ∣∣〈z|W kB ⊗ 1E|z′〉∣∣ . (B2)
We let UE be any Hermitian unitary operator acting on
HE. Such an operator can always be expressed as the
difference between two orthogonal projectors, which we
call PE and QE, such that UE = PE − QE. Inserting
1E = PE +QE into the last line of (B2) and developing,
we obtain
1
2 Tr[W
k
BYB] ≤
∣∣〈z|W kB ⊗ PE|z′〉∣∣+ ∣∣〈z|W kB ⊗QE|z′〉∣∣
≤
√
〈z|1kB ⊗ PE|z〉
√
〈z′|1kB ⊗ PE|z′〉
+
√
〈z|1kB ⊗QE|z〉
√
〈z′|1kB ⊗QE|z′〉
≤
√
〈z|1kB ⊗ PE|z〉+ 〈z′|1kB ⊗QE|z′〉
×
√
〈z′|1kB ⊗ PE|z′〉+ 〈z|1kB ⊗QE|z〉 , (B3)
in which we used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and that
(W kB)
2 = 1kB to obtain the second and third lines. Sub-
stituting PE =
1
2 (1E + UE) and QE =
1
2 (1E − UE),
1
2 Tr[W
k
BYB] ≤
√
pk +
1
2 Tr
[
(1kB ⊗ UE)Z
]
×
√
pk − 12 Tr
[
(1kB ⊗ UE)Z
]
=
√
p 2k − 14 Tr
[
(1kB ⊗ UE)Z
]2
, (B4)
where we recovered I = |z〉〈z| + |z′〉〈z′|, Z = |z〉〈z| −
|z′〉〈z′|, and pk = 12 Tr[1kBIB]. The end result rearranges
to (19) in the main text.
Appendix C: Tightness of the min-entropy bound
The lower bound (2) on the conditional min entropy is
tight and is attained with a PM version of the optimal
collective attack given in [3], which we describe here. We
set the states ρx,a (following Eve’s attack) to ρ = |α〉〈α|
and ρ′ = |α′〉〈α′|, where
|α〉 = |0〉B|ψ〉E , |α′〉 = |1〉B|ψ′〉E , (C1)
in which |0〉B and |1〉B are orthonormal and |ψ〉E and
|ψ′〉E are normalised states whose inner product defines
the specific attack. We set 〈ψ|ψ′〉 = Fz for some real
constant 0 ≤ Fz ≤ 1. We also set σ = |β〉〈β| and σ′ =
|β′〉〈β′| with
|β〉 = 1√
2
(|α〉+ |α′〉) , (C2)
|β′〉 = 1√
2
(|α〉 − |α′〉) . (C3)
With these definitions, the source states span a qubit
subspace. Note that 〈α|α′〉 = 〈β|β′〉 = 0, such that α =
β = 1.
From the above definitions, we have that ρE = |ψ〉〈ψ|E
and ρ′E = |ψ′〉〈ψ′|E, and thus
D(ρE, ρ
′
E) =
√
1− F 2z . (C4)
For the operators Z = |α〉〈α|− |α′〉〈α′| and X = |β〉〈β|−
|β′〉〈β′| = |α〉〈α′|+ |α′〉〈α|, we find the partial traces
ZB = |0〉〈0|B − |1〉〈1|B = σz (C5)
and
XB = Fz
(|0〉〈1|B + |1〉〈0|B) = Fzσx . (C6)
For optimal measurements on Bob’s side, we can write
(11) as
S = 12‖ZB +XB‖1 + 12‖ZB −XB‖1
= 12‖σz + Fzσx‖1 + 12‖σz − Fzσx‖1
= 2
√
1 + F 2z , (C7)
which rearranges to
Fz =
√
S2/4− 1 . (C8)
Combining with (C4) confirms that we have described a
family of attacks for which D(ρE, ρ
′
E) =
√
2− S2/4.
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